

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00447 01 OF 02 071614Z

41

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 NRC-05 EB-07 ERDA-05 CIAE-00

H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01

PM-04 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

TRSE-00 NSC-05 /101 W

----- 020619

R 071510Z OCT 75

FM US DEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1210

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN 0947

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA0447

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: BILATERAL DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET

REPRESENTATIVES ON OCTOBER 1, 1975

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: ON OCTOBER 1, US REP AND DEPREP HAD DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY. MEETING TOOK PLACE AT US INVITATION. KHLESTOV TOOK PESSIMISTIC LINE, SAYING SOVIET LEADERS WERE BECOMING INCREASINGLY SKEPTICAL OF WESTERN MOTIVATION IN THE VIENNA TROOP REDUCTION TALKS AND OF WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO COME TO REAL OUTCOME BECAUSE OF (A) REFUSAL OF WESTERN EUROPEANS TO UNDERTAKE REDUCTION COMMITMENTS; (B) CONTINUED INCREASES IN WESTERN MILITARY CAPABILITY DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS; (C) REFUSAL OF WEST TO INCLUDE AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN REDUCTIONS. KHLESTOV

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00447 01 OF 02 071614Z

ASSERTED THAT, AS A RESULT, MANY SOVIET LEADERS WERE COMING

TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE WEST WAS "EXPLOITING" THE VIENNA TALKS AS A DEFENSE AGAINST WESTERN PARLIAMENTARY PRESSURE FOR FORCE REDUCTIONS AND AS A COVER FOR FORCE INCREASES. END SUMMARY.

2. US REP STARTED DISCUSSION BY COMMENTING THAT US HAD BEEN PLEASED TO HEAR WHAT HAD BEEN SAID AT HELSINKI AND SINCE BY EASTERN LEADERS THAT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WERE NOW TO BE CONSIDERED ONE OF THEIR TOP PRIORITIES. WASHINGTON HOPED THIS MEANT THAT THERE WOULD BE PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA TALKS IN THE PRESENT ROUND, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THOSE MAJOR POINTS WHICH THE ALLIES HAD EMPHASIZED DURING THE LAST TWO ROUNDS OF THE TALKS. HE WISHED TO REFER IN PARTICULAR TO THE POINT WHICH WESTERN REPS HAD BEEN MAKING DURING THE LAST ROUND THAT AN AGREEMENT WOULD CREATE CERTAIN ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGES FOR THE SOVIET UNION OWING TO ITS OWN GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY, ADVANTAGES WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF IN CALCULATING REDUCTIONS.

3. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE AN ACCOUNT OF THE CURRENT VIEWS OF SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIALS ON THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AS HE HAD HEARD THEM IN A SERIES OF BROAD CONSULTATIONS HE HAD CONDUCTED DURING THE RECESS. HE WISHED TO BE FRANK AND TO REPORT THAT THERE WAS A MOOD OF INCREASING SKEPTICISM IN MOSCOW ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND ABOUT WESTERN MOTIVATION IN PARTICIPATING IN THEM. OF ALL OF THE SORE POINTS FOR MOSCOW, MOSCOW OFFICIALS WERE MOST DISTURBED BY THE FAILURE OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN TO UNDERTAKE REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS. MOSCOW OFFICIALS HAD PROGRESSIVELY BECOME CONVINCED THROUGH OBSERVING WESTERN EUROPEAN BEHAVIOR IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND OUTSIDE THEM THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE NOT WILLING TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES AND, IN FACT, WERE ONLY WILLING TO ACCEPT A US-SOVIET REDUCTION IN WHICH THE SOVIETS REDUCED MORE THAN THE US. MAINTENANCE OF THIS ATTITUDE MEANT THAT THERE COULD BE NO AGREEMENT AND WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT REASON FOR GROWING SKEPTICISM IN MOSCOW. MOREOVER, MOSCOW WHOLLY REJECTED THE CONTENTION OF SOME WESTERN LEADERS THAT THE USSR OWED THE WEST SOMETHING IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS IN RETURN FOR COMPLETION OF CSCE. THIS ARGUMENTATION WAS SPECIOUS AND THE USSR REJECTED IT FLATLY.

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SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00447 01 OF 02 071614Z

4. KHLESTOV SAID THERE WERE TWO INTERPRETATIONS IN MOSCOW AS TO THE US ROLE IN THIS PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY ABOUT THE FAILURE OF THE WESTERN EUROPEANS TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO REDUCTIONS. THE FIRST WAS THAT THE US HAD THUS FAR BEEN UNABLE TO CONVINCE THE WESTERN EUROPEANS THAT THEY SHOULD ENTER REDUCTIONS COMMITMENTS. THE SECOND WAS THAT THE US WAS ACTIVELY ENCOURAGING WESTERN EUROPEAN RESISTANCE TO REDUCTIONS

BECAUSE IT WISHED TO SHIFT MORE OF THE DEFENSE BURDEN TO THE GERMANS.

5. KHLESTOV SAID A FURTHER SOURCE OF CONCERN IN MOSCOW WAS THE EXPANSION OF WESTERN FORCES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS TRUE THAT NO FORMAL COMMITMENT HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN AT THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS NOT TO INCREASE FORCES. NONETHELESS, THERE WAS AN UNDERSTOOD OBLIGATION IN ENTERING ANY NEGOTIATION NOT TO SEEK TO CHANGE THE BASIC SITUATION TO ONE'S FAVOR WHILE THE NEGOTIATION WAS GOING ON. MANY PEOPLE IN MOSCOW WERE COMING TO THINK THAT THE WEST WAS DELIBERATELY USING THE NEGOTIATIONS AS A COVER FOR INCREASING ITS FORCES.

6. US REP ASKED WHETHER KHLESTOV MEANT TO IMPLY THAT THE MANPOWER OF NATO FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA WAS INCREASING. IF SO, WOULD HE INDICATE BY WHAT AMOUNT? KHLESTOV RAPIDLY DREW BACK, APPARENTLY FEARING THAT THIS LINE WOULD LEAD TO DISCUSSION OF THE DATA ISSUE. HE SAID BOTH SECRETARY SCHLESINGER AND MINISTER LEBER AND OTHER WESTERN LEADERS HAD REFERRED TO CURRENT INCREASES IN NATO'S MILITARY CAPABILITY. US DEPREP SAID THAT ALLIED REPS HAD ALREADY POINTED OUT THAT NATO WAS ENGAGED IN A FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM AND THAT THE WARSAW

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00447 02 OF 02 071717Z

41

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA0447

FROM US REP MBFR

PACT COUNTRIES WERE INCREASING THEIR ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE ASKED WHETHER SOVIET LEADERS HAD RAISED THIS SECOND POINT TOO IN CRITICIZING THE NATO FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM. KHLESTOV INDICATED THAT HE WANTED TO DROP THE SUBJECT. SMIRNOVSKY SAID, ANYWAY, THE US WAS INCREASING THE NUMBER OF ITS CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES IN WEST GERMANY IN CONNECTION WITH ITS FORCE RESTRUCTURING. US DEPREP SAID EAST ALSO HAD CIVILIANS WORKING FOR ITS FORCES. SMIRNOVSKY SAID, YES, BUT NOT NEARLY SO MANY.

7. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT MOSCOW LEADERS WERE ALSO DISTURBED BY WESTERN FAILURE TO INCLUDE AIRCRAFT AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS IN REDUCTIONS. IN THE MINDS OF SOVIET LEADERS, ALL OF THESE WESTERN POSITIONS BUILT UP TO A PICTURE OF WESTERN INTENTION TO HOLD BACK ON REAL NEGOTIATION IN VIENNA AS FAR AS AN
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00447 02 OF 02 071717Z

OUTCOME WAS CONCERNED, BUT TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS AND EXPLOIT THEM AS A WAY OF DEALING WITH PARLIAMENTARY PRES-SURES FOR A FORCE REDUCTION IN SOME NATO COUNTRIES LIKE THE UNITED STATES AND THE NETHERLANDS AND A COVER FOR CONTINUED REARMAMENT.

8. US DEPREP SAID IT WAS DISAPPOINTING TO HEAR THAT THUS FAR SOVIET LEADERS HAD NOT SHOWN MORE UNDERSTANDING FOR THE MAIN POINTS WHICH WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD BEEN MAKING IN VIENNA. BASICALLY, IT WAS THAT THE OVERALL GAIN IN SOVIET SECURITY FROM AN AGREEMENT WOULD MORE THAN COMPENSATE FOR THE REDUCTIONS THE WEST WAS ASKING FOR AND ALSO THAT THE GREATER SIZE OF THESE REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT OBSCURE THE FACT THAT THESE FORCES WOULD ONLY HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN A SHORT DISTANCE TO THEIR HOME TERRITORY, WHERE THEIR TOTAL NUMBER WOULD NOT BE LIMITED. AS REGARDS THE SUSPICIONS WHICH KHLESTOV WAS REPORTING, HE BELIEVED WESTERN LEADERS WERE TAKING EASTERN LEADERS AT THEIR WORD WHEN THE LATTER SAID THEY WERE NOW PREPARED TO GIVE TOP PRIORITY TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. EQUALLY, SOVIET OFFICIALS SHOULD TAKE WESTERN LEADERS, INCLUDING PRESIDENT FORD AND SECRETARY KISSINGER, AT FACE VALUE WHEN THEY SAID THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO MOVE FORWARD IN VIENNA IF BOTH SIDES SHOWED EQUAL FLEXIBILITY.

9. KHLESTOV INDICATED HE WAS WILLING TO LEAVE THE POINT AT

THAT. HE SAID THAT, WITH REGARD TO THE POINT RAISED BY US REPS CONCERNING SOVIET GAINS FROM THE NEGOTIATION ARISING FROM THE PROXIMITY OF THE USSR TO THE REDUCTION AREA, MOSCOW COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS ARGUMENT AS A BASIS FOR AGREEMENT. FIRST, THE ARGUMENT WAS TOTALLY BASED ON THE EXTREME SITUATION, THAT IS, OF THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. IN DOING SO, IT IGNORED THE POINT THAT THE WHOLE GOAL OF AN AGREEMENT WAS TO DECREASE THE RISK OF WAR AND TO CONSOLIDATE DETENTE IN THE MILITARY SHPHERE. SECOND, THE ARGUMENT WAS BASED ON STANDING FORCES ONLY AND IGNORED MOBILIZATION CAPACITIES, ESPECIALLY THOSE OF THE FRG. THIRD, THE ARGUMENT WENT OUTSIDE THE AGREED AREA TO MAKE A SPECIAL POINT ABOUT THE SITUATION OF ONE PARTICIPANT, THE USSR. IF ONE WERE TO GO OUTSIDE THE AREA FOR THE PURPOSE OF ARGUMENTATION, THEN THE ENTIRE AREA OUTSIDE WOULD HAVE TO BE BROUGHT IN, INCLUDING US BASES IN WESTERN EUROPE, REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES OF NATO FORCES OUTSIDE THE AREA, SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00447 02 OF 02 071717Z

AND SO ON.

10. KHLESTOV COMMENTED THAT AFTER ALL, VHE EAST HAD SHOWN FLEXIBILITY DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS WHEREAS THE WEST HAD NOT MOVED DURING THE PAST ROUNDS. US DEPREP COMMENTED THAT GDR REP HAD MADE THE SAME POINT IN HIS OPENING PLENARY STATEMENT AND SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE EAST HAD MOVED AND IT WAS NOW UP TO THE WEST TO DO SO. APPARENTLY, THIS WAS THE AGREED EASTERN "LINE" FOR THE BEGINNING OF THIS ROUND, THAT THE EAST WOULD NOT MOVE UNLESS THE WEST DID SO FIRST. KHLESTOV SAID THIS WAS APPARENTLY THE LINE BEING TAKEN BY BOTH SIDES, SO THAT PRESENT PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS DID NOT LOOK TOO FRUITFUL.

11. IT WAS NOTABLE THAT NEITHER KHLESTOV NOR SMIRNOVSKY, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE SINGLE MENTION OF THE DISAPPOINTMENT OF MOSCOW LEADERS OVER WESTERN FALIURE TO INCLUDE AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS IN REDUCTIONS, MENTIONED NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT ALL AND DID NOT PROBE AS TO THE REPORTED WESTERN REVIEW OF ITS POSITION ON THIS TOPIC.

12. US REP GAVE A SUMMARY ACCOUNT OF THIS DISCUSSION TO THE AD HOC GROUP MEETING ON OCTOBER 1. RESOR

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 OCT 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: greeneet
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975MBFRV00447
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750348-0066
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19751074/aaaacold.tel
Line Count: 268
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: greeneet
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03 APR 2003 by SmithRJ>; APPROVED <16 SEP 2003 by greeneet>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: BILATERAL DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES ON OCTOBER 1, 1975
TAGS: PARM, US, UR, XT, NATO
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006